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CORPORATE FINANCING UNDER LATIN AMERICAN
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
CRESWELL M. MICOU

Corporation laws of Latin American countries are coming to have increasing significance for the American lawyer, business man, and investor. This
is due to the increasing activity and investments in Latin American countries; to increasing advantages in incorporating in the country where a foreign business or enterprise is to be conducted (as opposed to organizing an
American corporation and qualifying it in the foreign country) ; and to the
greater interchange of thought and experience in seeking to meet the problems arising under modern corporate financing.
For purely subsidiary operations of American corporations financed in
this country, the relative advantages of the foreign or American corporation
depend upon varied factors. Taxes are always important. Suitability of the
corporation laws for financing is seldom a controlling factor. It is for the
individual investor in an enterprise wholly conducted abroad, however, that
the foreign corporation formed in the country where operations are conducted
often presents great advantages. Consequently, for such enterprises the
corporation laws of the particular country are of the utmost importance.
The trend towards incorporation in foreign countries for American operations to be conducted there is fostered by developments in this country.
From the viewpoint of the corporation itself, the taxes upon an American
corporation are generally not only higher, but also more restrictive, than
those upon the foreign corporation. Several of the Latin American countries have no income tax and others, to encourage economic development,
impose the tax at rates considerably less than the normal corporate income
tax in the United States. But in addition to the normal tax, the American
corporation is subject to the capital stock tax and the excess profits tax and
is restricted by the undistributed profits tax and Section 102 of the Revenue
1
Act of 1936, relating to accumulation of surplus. These taxes are not designed to encourage new enterprises. Regardless of their appropriateness
in this country (as to which opinions differ considerably), these taxes severely
affect the ability of an American corporation to build up new enterprises
abroad and to compete with capital from other nations. In Brazil, for instance, the tax philosophy has been quite the reverse and deductions have been
allowed for earnings reinvested in plant and equipment. Aside from the con'Of

course, if a stockholder or a small group avail of a foreign corporation to avoid

surtax by permitting earnings to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business, attempt will doubtless be made to enforce the tax imposed by § 102 against the
stockholders. But most bona fide enterprises in foreign countries involve extended
periods of development and require substantial reinvestment of earnings.
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flict in underlying principle, the net result is that income of the Latin
American corporation is by and large subject to less tax and its operations
subject to less restrictions than in the case of an American corporation doing
business in the same Latin American country or countries, with resultant advantage to the stockholders of the former. Where all stockholders are residents or citizens of the United States, the repeal of exemption of dividends
of domestic corporations from the normal personal income tax has removed
what was formerly sometimes an advantage to stockholders of an American
corporation as compared with a foreign corporation. But wv~here for the
supposed advantage of greater facility in financing in American markets corporations were formerly organized under our laws by persons some or all
of whom are foreigners, the foreign stockholders naturally suffer from the
payment of the higher United States income taxes and are less inclined to
favor the American corporation.
These factors have made for increasing use of the foreign corporation as
a vehicle for investment in foreign countries. This tendency and the offering in this country of securities of foreign corporations, not necessarily
controlled here, have made the American investor more familiar with corporate procedure and financing under foreign laws. Of course, registration of securities of a foreign corporation under the Federal Securities Act
of 1933, as amended, is often more difficult than registration of securities
of an American corporation, because of the different and more complicated
formalities of their corporate procedure, the greater time required to take
corporate action, and the time and expense of communication. Nevertheless, greater familiarity with procedure under foreign laws and with the
advantages of the foreign corporation as a vehicle for financing may be expected to bring more registrations by foreign corporations, where the laws
of the country of incorporation are found to be reasonably workable.
Increasing comparative law research into the corporation laws of other
countries may be attributed to a recognition that abuses have grown up here
and to a readiness to experiment with corrective measures adopted in other
countries. The danger faced is in attempting to implant foreign institutions here without fully considering their adaptability and fitness or the difference in character and degree of abuse which the provisions of the foreign law were designed to prevent. Comparison must be made not only of the
purpose but also of the results of such laws; for experience has shown
that a measure designed to accomplish a particular result may often in the
long run produce a result contrary to that intended. Open-minded consideration of legal institutions under different systems of law cannot but prove
beneficial if the underlying differences of the two systems be borne in mind
and the benefits derived under one system be carefully considered in the
light of the existing practices and legal institutions in the other country.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
This article is subdivided into four main topics: First, corporate procedure
and practice under Latin American laws; second, the difficulties in financing
thereunder; third, the possible influence of the civil law upon corporation
laws in this country; and fourth, the possible effect of our common law
doctrines upon Latin American corporation laws and financing.
I.

LATIN A

uERICAN CORPORATE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE

Preliminarily, it should be noted that the corporation is not in nearly so
common use in Latin American countries as it is in the United States. Large
businesses and enterprises in which more than one individual or a small
group are interested are not as common as in this country. The laws of most
Latin American countries offer as many as five or six types of organizations
for purposes characterized as "commercial" as distinguished from "civil."
In addition to the general partnerships, there are limited partnerships, limited partnerships with shares, limited liability companies, and cooperative
companies and corporations. Usually, only corporations and limited partnerships with shares are authorized to issue stock or formal share certificates. The limited liability company is really a form of partnership with only
special partners; the interest of each partner may consist of one or more
equal parts of the capital which may not be represented by transferable certificates, their transfer being subject to various formal requisites and consents.
These special forms of organization other than the corporation are
admirably adapted to the conduct of the small or closely-held enterprise.
They have been so extensively utilized that there has not been the demand
for liberalization of the corporation laws experienced in this country. In
some countries, for instance, specific governmental authorization is still required for the organization of corporations. 2 Others have adopted a regime
frequently referred to as "regulated freedom" of incorporation. 3 Some of
2

ARGENTINA CoM. CODE art. 318.
BOLIVIA CoM. CODE art. 247; Decree March 8, 1860, art. 1.
CHILE CoM. CODE art. 427.
ECUADOR Cobs. CODE arts. 288, 289.
GUATEMALA COM. CODE art. 303, Executive Order of July 7,

1903.

HAITI Com. CODE art. 37.

HONDURAS CoM. CODE art. 286.
PARAGUAY COM. CODE art. 318.
URUGUAY COM. CODE arts. 405, 407.

*Brazil! Decree No. 434 of July 4, 1891, art. 4.
Colombia: Law No. 27 of 1887, amending Coar. CODE art. 17.
Costa Rica: Law No. 6 of Nov. 24, 1909, art. 4.
CUBA CoM. CODE arts 117, 119.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Coar. CODE art. 37.
EL SALVADOR COM. CODE art. 236.
Mexico: General Law of Commercial Companies of July 28, 1934, art. 2.
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the latter require governmental authorization for organization of corporations for specified purposes. 4
Generally speaking, procedure for organization of corporations is cumbersome and complicated in comparison with American proceedings. If
familiarity with the system is acquired, the difficulties may be resolved into
a matter of the time element involved. Two methods typify the procedure
for the organization of a corporation: (1) An agreement in the form of a
public instrument, setting forth the corporate statutes (corresponding to our
articles of incorporation and by-laws) and signed by all the initial subscribers
of capital stock; and (2) public subscription.
In countries where incorporation requires governmental authorization, the
agreement of association must be submitted for approval, sometimes requiring weeks or months in certain countries. In some countries, the incorporation papers must be published in the official gazette, diario, or newspaper, 5
as well as recorded in some public office. Organization procedure may
require from four or five days to several weeks, depending upon the length
of documents, arrangements with the notary, frequency of publications, and
frequency of action by the governmental department in accepting the publications for filing. One reason why it is impracticable in some countries to
take preparatory steps in advance and have corporate proceedings started,
whenever there is any possibility that a corporation may have to be organized,
is the requirement that the entire capital be subscribed at the time of incorporation. If the corporation be formed with merely a nominal capital, substantially the same procedure is required for an increase; and little advantage is to be derived from organizing initially a corporation with nominal
capital.
Incorporation by public subscription frequently takes longer and is not
often resorted to. Under this procedure, the promoters prepare and publish
a prospectus, proposed articles of incorporation, and by-laws. When the
subscriptions of the capital stock have been obtained, a meeting is held at
NICARAGUA COM. CODE arts. 19, 204, 209.
Panama: Law No. 32 of 1927, arts. 2, 4, 6.
PERU COM. CODE arts. 124, 126.
VENEZUELA CoAr. CODE art. 224.

"Brazil, for certain banking, insurance, savings, and social service corporations, including those engaged in producing food products. Decree No. 434 of July 4, 1891, art. 46.
El Salvador, for corporations enjoying governmental concession or privilege. Conr.
CODE art. 240.
NICARAGUA COM. CODE art. 209.
'Brazil: Decree No. 434 of July 4, 1891, art. 80.
VENEZUELA CoM. CODE arts. 220, 221.
Publication of mere extracts is required in:
Costa Rica: Law No. 6 of Nov. 24, 1909, arts. 4, 8.
DOMINICAT REPUBLIC Com. CODE art. 42.
NICARAGUA CoM. CODE

art. 204.
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which the incorporation papers are presented and approved, whereupon the
papers are either submitted for governmental approval or protocolized with
a notary public, as may be required, and registered. The purpose and effect
of these requirements are generally similar to those of the Federal Securities
Act and the Blue Sky laws in this country. Corporation laws in all Latin
American countries are national laws rather than laws of a State, Province,
or Department; and it is, therefore, not unnatural to find the "public
offering" requirements embodied in the corporation law itself. Generally
speaking, these requirements are not as severe as those of the Federal
Securities Act here; for the corporation under Latin American laws has
not, in general, attained the same growth or development as in this country; and the expense of registration under the Federal Securities Act here
would be a formidable bar to any public offerings of the size and nature
now found in most of the Latin American countries. The "public subscription" method is not described at length in all of the codes and corporation laws. Only a few countries provide for it in any detail.6 It is developed
most fully in the legislation of Argentina and Mexico.
The formalities for corporate meetings are impressive. Naturally, publication of notice of meeting is required if bearer shares are outstanding. Brazil
requires such publication even though all shares are registered and irrespective of any waiver of notice.7 Governmental supervision of the meetings is
provided for under the laws of Argentina." In Chile, it is optional for the
Government's supervisor to be present at meetings of 'stockholders. 9 Minutes are customarily entered in longhand on the minute book and in some
countries are signed by all attending stockholders. In certain countries they
must be published in the official diario or newspaper.
It is through control of the voting power that the civil law makes its
greatest attempt to "regulate" the corporation and protect the interests of
stockholders. Refinements of this control mechanism, such as have recently
been urged in France and which will be later discussed, have apparently
not yet gained much favor in Latin American countries. The "'regulation"
with respect to voting power, so far employed, is in the form of a prohibition in some nations of the so-called "plural vote," and the requirement, where
there is more than one class of stock, that the par value of the different
classes be the same and all shares be entitled to the same vote. The "plural
AORGENTINA

Com. CoDE art. 320 et seq.

Brazil: Decree No. 434 of 1891, arts. 71 et seq.
Costa Rica: Law No. 6 of 1909, arts. 71 et seq.
Mexico: General Law of Commercial Companies of 1934, arts. 90, 92 et seq.
7
Decrees No. 23 and 324 of Nov. 6, 1933, art. 2.
ODecree of April 27, 1923, art. 23.
gDecree No. 251 of May 20, 1931, art. 83, subdiv. e.
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vote" is an institution which has been utilized extensively in Europe to
assure control of a corporation to a small group, but it has not been greatly
resorted to in Latin America even where permitted. Specific provision
authorizing cumulative voting for directors is found in the law of Mexico. 10
The voting trust is apparently not specifically provided for. The trust, as
here known, is not generally recognized under the civil law. In some instances, however, voting trusts have been created under the laws of states
in this country, limited to a term of years and for lives of specified persons.
The management of the corporation under Latin American laws differs
considerably in practice from that in this country and England. The directors
or administrators are"elected by stockholders in accordance with the corporate
statutes and the corporation laws. Directors are considered mandataries or
agents of the stockholders, rather than trustees. Liability of directors is
generally determined by the corporation law, and sometimes by applicable
provisions of the commercial code or civil, code. In most Latin American
countries, directors are subject to dismissal ad nutum by majority vote at a
special stockholders' meeting. This is a consequence of the underlying
theory of mandate and the power of the stockholders, as principal, to terminate the agency at will. It carries out the legalistic approach of the civil law.
In Mexico, where cumulative voting is provided for by law, the minority
directors are subject to dismissal only when all the other directors are to be
dismissed."
The difference in practice lies in the fact that directors of Latin American
corporations are generally fewer in number, and each generally has active
duties of administration of the corporation. They usually perform important
administrative duties instead of merely acting as a board to determine
policies and appoint executive officers. Thus, a typical directorate of a Latin
American corporation might be a director-president, a technical director, a
commercial director, and one or two additional directors, whose tasks might
correspond to those of treasurer and secretary in an American corporation.
The corporate statutes may specify segregation of duties or may merely
stipulate the total number of directors and the number thereof, if more than
one, whose act is necessary to bind the corporation. Almost without exception, the Latin American laws provide for election by the stockholders of a
fiscal council or one or more fiscal supervisors (generally called condsarios
or sindicos) whose function varies from mere verification of the annual
balance sheet and profit and loss statement to a wide range of duties and
prerogatives including the duty to pass upon proposed increases of capital
and the right to propose dismissal of any of the directors.
"General Law of Commercial Companies of July 28, 1934, art. 144.
"General Law of Commercial Companies of July 28, 1934, art. 144.
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Control by majority vote of the stockholders is established in principle in
all of the Latin American countries to an extent far beyond that known here.
This feature of practically absolute control by the majority has been the
subject of increasing adverse criticism in recent years. It is coming to be
recognized as responsible for the reluctance of small investors to participate
in corporate enterprises, for attempts to increase artificial safeguards thrown
around the corporate structure, and for the consequent reluctance of legislators to permit greater freedom in the capital structure.
II.

DIFFICULTIES IN CORPORATE FINANCING UNDER LATIN AMERICAN

LAWS

Apart from the time-consuming procedural requirements, the most important obstacles to corporate financing under Latin American laws, in the
opinion of the writer, are: First, the practically unfettered control of the
majority and lack of equitable remedies; second, the limitation in the amount
and types of securities issuable; third, restrictions on consolidations and reorganizations; and, fourth, heavy taxes restrictive of normal financing
activities.
The degree of control by the majority of stockholders and the lack
of any real and effective protection of minority stockholders made uninviting the purchase of scattered shares of corporations without majority
control. 12 To those in control it means a.distinct detriment in the raising of
funds through public subscription.
The civilists, in their logical approach to the corporate entity have until
recent years adhered literally to the theory of the corporate contract-that
when an individual subscribes for or purchases stock of a corporation he
does so subject to the absolute rule of the majority according to numerical
voting rights and subject only to the specific limitations in the corporate
statutes and the corporation law; that by the acquisition of voting shares he
acquires a given number of votes and has the free right to exercise those
votes, either with absolute control if he is in the majority or subject to the
absolute control of others if he is in the minority. Selfish interest in voting
is subject, not to the broad restraints of equity, but only to those limitations
specifically prescribed by law or in the corporate statutes; and consequently,
if no specific limitation be transgressed, the majority cannot be restrained
from any action taken or contemplated. In short, the civilist may take a
given set of facts and legal precepts and work out a course of. action within

"An instance is reported in which a prospective purchaser of a large majority of
stock of a Latin American corporation cabled to that country and inquired about the
rights of minority stockholders. He was advised, in effect, that the only effective right
of the minority is to sell their shares.'
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the specific limitations prescribed without regard to the power of an equity
court to consider the facts upon broad principles of equity and, if need be, to
create or recognize new principles.
Not only is this concept a present detriment to distribution of stock to
small holders, but it tends toward increasing rigor of artificial, as opposed to
natural, restrictions, the former being so often ineffective and burdensome.
However, as later noted under Point III, the French doctrine has made
significant progress toward the application of principles analogous to those
of equity based on "good faith" in interpreting the corporate contract governing the rights and duties of corporate stockholders. Development along that
line seems the only real safeguard to the small investor and highly preferable
to the alternative of increased artificial restrictions. The limitations in
amounts and types of securities issuable vary greatly from country to country.
Generally speaking, their laws seem designed to fix more rigidly the pattern
and mould of the capital structure and, despite their strict contractual theory
of the relationship between stockholders, to leave less freedom of contract.
For many purposes for which the corporation is utilized in this country, the
rigidity of capital structure is not a great obstacle, for in Latin American
countries forms of organization other than the corporation may be used.
But for the development of a capital market greatly needed for economic
development, the rigid limitations often present great obstacles. One of the
most striking limitations is the requirement in some countries that all or a
substantial percentage of the capital stock be subscribed, not only upon the
organization of the corporation but on the occasion of each increase of
capital. In Brazil,13 Costa Rica,'14 Ecuador,15 El Salvador,' 6 Mexico,' 7 and
Venezuela,is 100% of the capital stock must be subscribed; in Guatemala' 9
23
22
21
and Honduras, 20 two-thirds; in Nicaragua, 50%; in Bolivia, and Chile,
one-third; in Argentina, 24 Paraguay,25 and Uruguay, 6 20%; in the Dominican Republic, 27 10%; in Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, Panama, and Peru, the law
is silent on the matter.
'Decree No. 434 of 1891, art. 65.
"'Law
No. 6 of 1909, art. 69.
1
"CoU. CODE art. 294.
'-CoMr. CODE art. 232.

"General Law of Commercial Companies of 1934, Art. 89.
'aCoM. CODE art. 254.

'Two-thirds, when incorporated by public instrument, Cor. CODE art. 305; 1007o,
when incorporated by public subscription, CoM. CODE art. 220.
'Com. CODE art. 288.
'CoU. CODE art. 206.
-'Decree of March 8, 1860, art. 1.
'CoM. CODE art. 428.
2
'CoM. CODE art. 318.
'CoM. CODE art. 318.
2
'Law of June 2, 1893, art. 3.
t'CoM. CODE art. 51 as amended.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
The theory behind the requirement that the entire capital be subscribed is
again the necessity for state tutelage of the corporation and the investor.
The purpose is to assure the stockholder that he will be informed as to the
true capital of the corporation. When the corporate capital is stated in the
corporate statutes or on the stock certificate, the stockholders, theoretically at
least, may assume that capital to that amount has been effectively paid in or
subscribed for the corporate venture. It is argued that if the stockholder or
investor had to observe the distinction between the issued capital and the
authorized capital stock, the latter figure perhaps much larger, there would
be greater chance of misunderstanding or deception than if only one figure
were stated. Thus, it is thought that, by requiring the entire capital to be
subscribed, the state guards the stockholders and investors against one possibility of abuse. The longer the system of complete or substantial subscriptiot of capital is continued, the more the man in the street comes to rely upon
it, and the more difficult becomes the task of directing the attention of the
investor to the intrinsic worth of a security rather than the extrinsic formalities, and, therefore, increasing safeguards must be thrown about the latter.
The greater also will be his distrust of corporate financing when he learns
that the capital may be illusory and this intended safeguard a means of deception.
A second limitation is as to the class of securities which may be issued.
28
Preferred stock is authorized only in nine of the Latin American republics.
It is expressly prohibited in Uruguay.2 9 In others where the law is silent,
its issuance would be inadvisable unless strong decisions or established doctrines could be found in its support. The provisions in practically all of the
countries relating to value of the shares are such as, in effect, to prohibit
shares without par value, with apparently the exceptions of only Chile,8 0
32
Mexico, 31 and Panama.
Only a few countries have detailed provisions regarding corporate bonds
'ARGENTINA

Cob!. CODE art. 334.

Brazil: Decree No. 21536.
Chile: Decree No. 251 of May 20, 1931, arts. 87, (subdiv. d), 97, and 104.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CoM. CODE art. 34, as amended by Law No. 1041 of 1935.
Mexico: General Law of Commercial Companies of July 28, 1934, arts. 91 (subdiv.

II), 112 et seq.
Cox. CODE arts. 124 (subdiv. 8), 131, 211, 224.
Panama: Law 32 of Feb. 26, 1927, arts. 2 (subdiv. 5), 7, 10 (subdiv. a), 11 et seq.
PARAGUAY Com. CODE arts. 283, 292 (subdiv. 2), 334.
VENEZUELA Com. CODE arts. 297, 298 (subdiv. 2).
'Com. CODE arts. 416, 418.
'Chile: Decree No. 251 of May 20, 1931, art. 117, requiring Presidential authorization.
!"Mexico: General Law of Commercial Companies of July 28, 1934, art. 125 (subdiv.
NIcARAGUA

IV).
*Panama: Law No. 32 of 1927, art. 7. The Panama law is based largely on that of
Florida.
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and debentures. Where no special legislation exists, the rules of the Code of
Commerce and of the Civil Code apply, the latter supplementing the former.
Under existing special laws, bonds and debentures for obtaining funds from
the public are subject to tutelage of the State. Consequently, freedom in
determining the terms and conditions of the obligation is the exception rather
3
than the rule, and certain requisites of debentures are prescribed by law.
In such cases, the corporation is limited to the issuance of debentures within
the prescribed terms. The general obligation must be in that form and may
or may not be given mortgage or other security, making the debenture, in
cases where such security is given, correspond to corporate bonds as here
known. Some Latin American debenture laws limit the amount of the issues
in relation to the amount of the corporate capital or assets. In Brazil, the
aggregate amount of all issues of a given corporation (except certain classes
of corporations) may not exceed the corporate capital as stated in the bylaws.3 4 In Mexico, the various issues must not exceed the net assets unless
the issue is intended to cover the price of purchase or construction of property
already contracted for.3 5 In Panama, the issues must not be in excess of the
paid-in capital. 6
Some Latin American nations have adopted directly or from legislation of
European nations the English system of debentures which may be secured
by a floating charge and, in some cases, by specific security as well.3 7 The
debenture without security has in the past been rather rare, issued only by
the larger companies of firmly established credit. The more customary form is
the debenture secured by a floating charge which, in effect, gives the debenture
holders as a group priority over general creditors in case of liquidation and,
in Brazil,38 the right to force dissolution and liquidation. Under this
system, the corporate debtor may sell and dispose of properties without obtaining specific releases. The lien securing the debentures is a floating lien
and is effective upon the existing property of the corporation on the happening of a given event, dissolution, bankruptcy, or sometimes default. In some
cases, for instance in Argentina, the corporation is prohibited from assigning
its assets or any part thereof, which might result in making it impossible to
"Argentina: Law No. 8875 of Feb. 23, 1912, art. 32.

Brazil: Decree No. 177-A of Sept. 15, 1893, art. 2.
Mexico: General Law of Negotiable Instruments and Credit Operations of Aug. 26,

1932, art. 210.
PANAMA CoM. CoDE art. 411.

"Decree No. 177-A of Sept. 15, 1893, art. 1, 3.
"Law of Aug. 26, 1932, *art.212.

wCoM. CODE art. 409.
wArgentina: Law No. 8875 of Feb. 23, 1912, art. 4.

Brazil: Decree No. 177-A of Sept. 15, 1893, art. 1.
Mexico: Law of Aug. 26, 1932, arts. 210 (subdiv. VII), 213 (subdiv. III), and 214.
"Decree No. 22,431 of Feb. 6, 1933, art. 13.
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continue in business and from merging with another corporation, unless expressly permitted by resolution of the debenture holders. 39 The debenture
with specific security, corresponding to corporate bonds as known here, is
not so customary and is not frequently used, except in the case of senior
financing offered in this country and, occasionally, in England or Europe.
The various .limitations as to the period for which mortgage registration is
effective, the necessity for detailed description of the properties, and the
cumbersome procedure for executing and-recording mortgages and releases
40
make the special security somewhat more difficult to obtain.
In some countries there have been special restrictions on debentures or
bonds in bearer form. The purpose was, in some cases, to prevent competition with the Government in the issue of currency and, in others, to prevent the conduct of unauthorized lotteries. For instance, Brazil 41 still retains
the so-called "anti-lottery" provisions which originated in the Belgian law of
May 18, 1873. Under these restrictions, if a debenture is subject to redemption by lot at a premium, it must bear interest at 3% per annum, the premium
must be the same throughout the period of redemption at a premium, and the
issue must be serviced by a fixed annuity, i.e., the sum of the interest payments
and sinking fund for redemption must be constant during the period the debentures are redeemable'at a premium. This means an obligatory cumulative
sinking fund, the initial sinking fund being increased by the amount by
which interest payments are from time to time decreased through redemp43
42
Similar provision is found in Mexico.
tion of debentures outstanding.
'Law No. 8875 of Feb. 23, 1912, art. 9.
'The original mortgage instrument, containing the detailed description of property,
must be entered in the notary's books, generally in longhand. Certified copies, prepared
and signed by the notary, and extracts containing the description prepared for registration must be recorded in the registry of mortgages. In the case of a mortgage and
deed of trust for a corporate bond issue which, with the detailed description, might
amount to some 200 printed pages, the procedure for entering, executing, and recording
the mortgage might well require a minimum of ten days or two weeks after the instrument would be ready for execution under our laws. In the case of a certain mortgage,
six notary clerks were engaged in alternate shifts to enter the mortgage in the notarial
books and make the certified copy for registration. A special train was held ready to
take the certified copy and extracts to the various recording offices, but even with such
facilities nine days were required to complete these formalities after the form of the
mortgage was ready for delivery to the notary, i.e., after the time when in this country
it was ready for mere signature and presentation for registration.
'Decree No. 177-A of Sept. 15, 1893, art. 6.
'In a certain instance, a foreign corporation in Brazil had agreed with bankers here
upon the terms of a bond issue to be offered in New York. The terms which'the
bankers had worked out included redemption at premiums graduated downward during
the life of the issue and with the sinking fund not on a cumulative basis. A complete
mortgage and deed of trust in the custoniary American form had been prepared by
American counsel and cabled to Brazil for execution and recordation. Upon examination of its terms there it was found not to conform with the requirements of the Brazilian
debenture law and it was necessary not only to revise substantially the mortgage and
deed of trust, but also for the Company and the bankers to reach a completely new agreement regarlding the terms of the proposed bond issue, naturally resulting in further delay.
"Law of Aug. 26, 1932, art. 211.
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Under existing legislation in most of the Latin American countries, the
long term open-end mortgage, or even a closed mortgage providing for serial
issue of bonds, presents almost insuperable difficulties. In the first place, the
period for which the registration of a mortgage is valid is frequently limited
to a fixed period of years. In the legislation of some countries, the right to
maintain the existing priority upon re-registering the mortgage while still in
force is uncertain and, even where that doubt is not present the continued
validity of the long term mortgage is dependent upon a further act of the
trustee or the debtor prior to expiration of the fixed period. Difficulty is
sometimes encountered in maintaining for any subsequent series or issue of
bonds the priority of the mortgage as originally registered, over liens intervening between the original registration and the subsequent issue of bonds.
In none of the Latin American countries, so far as the writer has had opportunity to investigate, is the after-acquired property clause as here known
effective, since the mortgage registration laws customarily required a minute
specification of the properties mortgaged, although, of course, improvements
constructed on mortgaged property will automatically become subject to the
mortgage under the doctrine of accession. Sometimes the difficulties are such
that resort must be had to the issue of bonds under an American form of agreement executed in this country specifically secured by individual and special
mortgages of different properties in the foreign country or countries. However, where an attempt is made to provide at the outset mortgage security
sufficient to cover subsequent issues of bonds, high taxes or recording fees
are frequently encountered.
In Argentina and Mexico, the powers of trustees have been extensively
regulated. In Argentina among other powers, they are authorized, for
instance, to examine the books of the corporation, attend meetings without
vote, in some cases move for dismissal of directors, and take up and manage
the business in case of default, heavy losses, or bankruptcy. 4 In Mexico,
they have these and various other powers, except that of taking up and
managing the business of the corporation. 45 Brazil has experimented with
a law designed to accomplish the same purpose, approached from a strictly
civilist viewpoint. Decree No. 22,431 of February 6, 1933, establishes and
regulates the community of interest among debenture holders. Unfortunately, this goes to the length of impairing the obligation itself, for it permits
action to amend the terms of the issue in material respects by holders of a
majority in amount of debentures at a meeting where two-thirds constitutes
a quorum. It goes further than merely requiring action by a specific percentage in order to enforce the security given, leaving the individual holder
"Law No. $875 of Feb. 23, 1912, art. 14 et seq.
'"Law of Aug. 26, 1932, art. 216 et seq.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
the right to sue on the obligation to pay, as is customary here in order to
maintain the negotiability of the instrument. In England and more recently
in this country, provision is not uncommon permitting amendment in certain
respects of the terms of the indenture affecting the security for debentures or
bonds. Generally, a high percentage vote is required and, in all cases, it is
a matter for stipulation in the original agreement or indenture and, consequently, a matter of volition as between the debtor corporation and a prospective purchaser of the debentures or bonds. Naturally, a law permitting
substantial amendment of the security and even the obligation itself, by a percentage vote (relatively low in the case of the Brazilian decree) would impair
the value of debentures generally. It is understood that the law in question has
not been favorably received by investors or the Exchanges.
In some countries the status of the trustee is in some doubt. Apart from
this legislation, numerous problems must be faced-whether a foreign Trust
Company may act within Latin American countries and accept a mortgage;
whether it must qualify to do business within the country and if so whether
it must comply with requirements relating to banks; and whether it would
be recognized in court in attempting to foreclose the mortgage as general
representative of the bondholders.
The foregoing review of limitations upon the amount and classes of securities issuable is sufficient to indicate difficulties which may be encountered in
financing under Latin American laws. When a preferred stock seems appropriate, it may not be issuable. When additional capital may be badly
needed, it may not be possible to issue further stock at par or better; the
very fiction of the par value makes stockholders reluctant to reduce the
capital to permit the corporation to issue further stock for cash, yet property
may be taken at excessive valuations, thereby further increasing the deception
from the statement of the capital. The first financing by bonds is frequently
insufficient for the needs of a growing company. Under closed mortgages,
so often necessary, and the restrictions upon the period of validity of the
mortgage registration, it is frequently but the precursor of numerous refundings if the corporation is to develop and grow.
The third major obstacle to corporate development and financing is found
in the restriction on consolidations and reorganizations. Few countries expressly permit consolidation or merger on less than unanimous vote. In
Argentina4 6 and Mexico,47 at least three-quarters of the outstanding capital
must be represented at the respective meetings, and the resolution must be
adopted by vote of not less than one-half of such outstanding capitall in
Argentina, any stockholder voting against the merger has the right to withCoDE art. 354.
"Com.
'7General Law of Commercial Companies of July 28, 1934, arts. 182, 190.
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draw and receive reimbursement of the book-value of his shares, but book
value is of course no indication of their real value. In El Salvador, the
merger must be approved by two-thirds of the capital. 48 In Brazil, which
lacks a definite and express provision, the law is interpreted as requiring
a unanimous vote of the outstanding capital. 4sa Many other laws are
silent about the matter, and the question would arise as to whether, in
the absence of express provision, mergers or consolidations require unanimous vote or ordinary majority. Particularly when the merger or consolidation would result in the creation of a new juridical entity, caution
dictates proceeding only on the assumption that a unanimous vote is required.
In such countries, dissolution of one or both of the corporations is often the
only expedient available. Ironically enough, dissolution and transfer of
assets permit treatment of a dissenting minority much less generous than
under the laws of those states in this country which permit dissolution upon
a specified vote, with provision for valuation of and payment for shares of
dissenting stockholders. Valuation on dissolution may well be less than
going concern value on consolidation.
In many countries, transfer of assets on dissolution or cbnsolidation is,
subject to high property transfer taxes. In some cases, these taxes are so
high as to block many consolidations otherwise advantageous. Even if consolidation through obtaining the required vote of stockholders be feasible and
the property transfer taxes not prohibitive, a further obstacle is sometimes
met in the income tax upon individual stockholders. So-called "tax free"
reorganizations are seldom recognized, and the individual stockholders are
faced with a tax upon.the amount by which the value of the shares of the
new corporation exceeds the cost to them of the shares of the old corpora-*
tion. This presents a further difficulty which must be surmounted to effect
a satisfactory consolidation or reorganization.
The fourth obstacle is the generally high scale of taxes encountered. The
taxes on capital, contracts generally, and transfer of property are frequently
so high as to discourage corporate organization and financing and to favor
continuance of individual enterprise. Such taxes vary so much from country
to country that space does not permit of particularization, but their cumulative effect is dearly a deterrent to corporate enterprise.
III. POSSIBLE

INFLUENCE OF THE CIVIL LAW UPON CORPORATION LAWS IN
THE UNITED STATES

An indication of the influence which the civil law may exert on corporation
law in this country is found in a recent copyrighted article by Henry Paine
"Com. CoDE art. 275.

"BSee Decree No. 434 of July 4, 1891, art. 148.
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Crawford in the January, 1937, issue of the District of Columbia Bar Association Journal. He "submits without hesitation that a selective combination of
the Mexican and Argentine laws governing industrial corporations, plus certain modifications relative to shares of stock, would make the almost perfect
corporation law." While the present writer has no desire to disparage the
corporation laws of the Latin American countries, nor the thought and learning which have contributed to them, he feels that any attempt to engraft upon
our common law system the laws of another system which is so fundamentally
different as the civil law could but lead to unfortunate results.
We have seen that Argentina requires governmental authorization for the
organization of corporations ;4 sb and that Mexico requires the full subscription
of the capital stock,48c that is, does not permit authorized and unissued capital.
The corporation laws of both countries naturally follow the civil law theories
rather than the common law, and protections of an equitable nature have not
been extensively developed. Consider, for example, one of the features of
the Argentine law to which Mr. Crawford points, viz., the requirement that
at least 2% of the earned and liquid profits of the corporation be set aside
to create a reserve fund until a total is reached equal to at least 10%o of the
corporate capital. Though the percentage required is low and though the
policy may be extremely desirable for some corporations and in certain
periods, the requirement is directly opposed to the philosophy of the undistributed profits tax in this country.49 Again, Mr. Crawford points out that
under the Mexican law a merger cannot take place until three months after
the merger agreement has been recorded in the public registry of commerce and published in the financial periodical of the domicile of the corporations, unless "payment of all debts of the corporation to be merged is
stipulated, or the deposit of such amount is created in a banking institution,
or when the consent of all creditors is granted in writing," unmatured debts
being considered matured as of the date of the merger. Payment or provision
for outstanding indebtedness, including unmatured, would obviously be out of
the question, or prohibitively expensive, in the case of the average wellestablished American industrial or business corporation. The effect of
such a law here would be to leave ineffective for a period of three months
a merger which, if feasible and advisable, ought to be effected with the
least possible delay.
Other features of the civil law sometimes urged for adoption in this coun' 8bSee note 2 supra.
"See note 17 supra.
"SIt is interesting that the Brazilian Income Tax Law, rather than penalizing reinvestment of profits in fixed plant equipment, has allowed deduction from taxable income for
amounts so reinvested to encourage economic and industrial development.
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try are: (1) The institution of a Fiscal or Supervising Council as representatives of the stockholders or the appointment of government officials to
supervise the operations and audit the accounts of the directors; (2) the
requirement that the value to be allowed for property tendered to a corporation in payment of capital stock be determined by appraisers appointed by
the stockholders; and (3) the dismissability ad nutum of directors.
The fiscal or supervising council sometimes accomplishes the end it is
theoretically designed to serve, but only rarely. More often, where the
council is not composed of dummies, it consists of a "whitewash" board of
prominent citizens sufficiently interested in the activities of the corporation
to consent to assume the responsibilities of their office and lend their names
to enhance the prestige of the corporation, perhaps unjustifiedly. It is an
institution designed to check and supervise the directors, but not infrequently
it lulls the stockholder into a false sense of security. If, as is normally
the case, the members of the fiscal council are appointed by the majority
stockholders, it is only natural that they are persons iii the full confidence
of the majority and without inclination to question the acts or motives of the
directors elected by the same majority. If, on the other hand, the fiscal
council were to be elected by the minority (a provision which would be
repugnant to the general principles of civil law corporations), the fiscal
council might, of course, be a more active check, but the power to check
might well develop obstructionist tactics and internecine strife to the detriment of the corporation.
In the view of the writer, provision for cumulative voting for directors,
permitting the minority an actual voice in the administration and imposing
a corresponding responsibility, supplemented as it is in this country by audits
made by certified public accountants in the case of larger corporations whose
securities are listed, is distinctly preferable and more practical. It neither
lulls the innocent stockholder into a false sense of security nor offers the
opportunity to obstruct without responsibility for management. Of course,
conditions here are by no means universally applicable. In some Latin American countries, where there are no securities exchanges nor well-established
certified public accountants (or the equivalent), the Fiscal or Supervising
Council may serve a purpose which could not otherwise be served. Even
under such circumstances, however, the institution may well result in misleading the investor. Obviously, the Argentine provision for attendance of
government representatives at meetings would be a degree of state intervention in the activities of our corporations (as distinguished from regulation)
repugnant to fundamental principles in this country. Considering the vast
number of corporations in this country, it would be alarming to contemplate
the effect of building up a bureaucracy of supervisors of corporate meetings.
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Provisions for appointment of appraisers for property tendered in payment for stock, found in the laws of so many Latin American countries, have
a like appeal from the purely theoretical viewpoint. In actual operation,
however, such appraisals seem to serve more as "window dressing" and as a
buffer to relieve the directors from the full responsibility to which they
would otherwise be subject. Theoretically, a stockholder who desires to
tender property in payment of stock may make an unconditional subscription in cash, binding himself to pay the full amount of any excess of his
subscription over the value at which the tendered property may be appraised;
in practice, however, the subscriber will not assume an obligation so uncertain without assurance as to the parties to be appointed as appraisers and as
to the value to be returned by them on their appraisal. It will be readily
seen that, in practice, there would be no payments for stock in property
without a simultaneous meeting of the minds between the party tendering
the property and the corporation accepting it in payment of the specified
amount of stock. In practice, subscriptions will not be made with the idea
of paying for the stock in property unless there is in effect an agreement or
understanding that the property to be tendered will be valued at the amount
of the stock subscription. It is difficult to conceive, for instance, of a total
outsider, not a stockholder, subscribing for stock and leaving to unknown
appraisers, to be appointed by the existing stockholders of the company (the
other party to the agreement), the determination of the value at which the
tendered property is to be received. It is idle to say that the subscriber
should be willing to pay in cash if the property is appraised at less than his
subscription. He places a definite value on his property and will not part
with it except for that value. He may have property and no cash or be
willing to transfer property but not cash. On analysis, the formalities of
appraisal appear as subterfuge. Any weight which the innocent small stockholder or future subscriber may attribute to them is too great, in the average case at least. They are, therefore, to be characterized in the writer's
opinion as more misleading than protective, unless it be in the sense of protecting directors from responsibility which they should assume.
The dismissability ad nutum of directors, which prevails under the civil
law with few exceptions, is sometimes referred to as an advantageous protection of stockholders. Recent occurrences, however, indicate a preference
for the system normally prevailing under the Anglo-Saxon law, i.e., election
and tenure of office for a stated period. Financial scandals in France have
revealed that the dismissability ad nutuin of directors has been used by
groups obtaining a dominant undisclosed stock interest as a weapon to compel
action by weak directors to the advantage of the group and to the detriment
of minority stockholders. In this country, the laws of Nevada have been
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severely criticized for permitting removal of directors by action of stockholders
without cause.
This situation has given rise to discussion of various reforms, many of
them fanciful, to guard against these and other abuses by controlling the
voting power of stock. Such proposals include differentiation in voting
power of stock according to number of shares held (for instance, limiting
the aggregate voting power of any one stockholder to 10% of the stock,
regardless of the number of shares held) ; no vote, or lesser vote, for certain
kinds of stock (bearer shares, the floating supply in market trading);
length of time the stock has been held (longer holding as representing a
more responsible interest in the corporate affairs) ; and other highly artificial
differentiations which would seem impractical and, perhaps, admit of greater
abuses than are now current. 50 They are particularly illustrative of the
invitation to evasion from artificial attempts at control. For instance, in
countries which now place a maximum limitation upon the number of shares
which any one shareholder may vote, it is customary practice to have large
blocks of stock split up among several stockholders in order to retain the
full voting strength. Differentiation in voting power between bearer and
registered stock has nowhere been adopted, to the writer's knowledge, but
would seem not only to be ineffective but to introduce elements of uncertainty and surprise, with the possibility of converting bearer shares into
registered shares on the eve of any vote. It is interesting to note that in
this country the possible abuse of voting "streetname" stock has been met
by requiring brokers to obtain consent of the customer before voting stock
held in streetnames. Premium on the vote of shares longer held would,
in cases where the vote is important, attach an unjustified value to the
acquisition of such shares by an opposing interest, eliminating a preponderant vote against them, and would even invite arrangements under which
shares might continue to be held in the name of the former registered
holders, retaining the voting premium even after the beneficial ownership
has passed to others. All of these proposed "devices" are suggestive of a
cure that is worse than the ailment.
On the whole, a review of the experience in civil law countries and a
comparison with the experience under English common law will show:
(1) the civil law has heretofore afforded practically no protection of
an equitable nature (as distinguished from that founded upon
express provisions of law) to minority stockholders or defrauded
investors;
(2) abuses in corporate financing have been greater, relatively at least,
under the cloak of artificial restrictions as safeguards of the civil
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(3)

(4)

(5)
(6)

(7)

law than under the greater freedom of corporate procedure and
finance permitted under common law, subject to the protection and
restraint afforded by the courts of equity;
the dominant principle of control by the majority, based upon the
supposed contractual right of the individual stockholder to vote
his stock to his own interest, is largely responsible for the abuses
which have been found to exist in the civil law;
increased artificial restrictions on the rights of the corporation, its
directors and stockholders, have not resulted in the improvements
hoped for, have generally impeded normal corporate development,
and, in some cases, have resulted in cloaking other and different
abuses than those aimed at;
civil law courts and authorities are now tending to develop protective measures of an equitable nature, still far from those
afforded under the common law;
the relatively greater growth and development of corporations
under common law is due, in some part at least, to reliance upon
equitable protection rather than specific restrictions and limitations
in the corporation laws;
the lack of other forms of limited liability organizations under
common law requires greater flexibility in the corporation laws here
than in civil law countries, for the corporation here must be resorted
to for many purposes for which partnerships or companies with
limited liability of all members may serve under the civil law.

Financial journals and textbooks in civil .law countries are replete with
instances in which a corporation or a group has acquired control and exercised such control exclusively in its own interest and to the detriment of
minority stockholders. To persons familiar with the doctrines of equity
applicable in the United States and England, some of the cited abuses of
minority stockholders of foreign corporations seem veritable ppoliation,
meriting without question or hesitation the intervention of a court of
equity.51 The right of the stockholder to vote in his own interest has been
deemed a contractual right which he acquires upon purchasing the shares.
It has given rise to the conception of the "contractual" theory of corporations under the civil law, in contradistinction to the newly developing "institutional" theory, which Gaillard describes as follows:
"According to the institutional theory the power of each organ is
limited by its purpose and cannot be turned against such purpose.
"The purpose of the stockholders' meetings is to control, to require
the directors to follow the common good and not to permit them to violate it with impunity.
'The power of the stockholders meeting thus receives a primary
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limitation of purpose. Whenever it exceeds that limitation, its acts
may be referred to the court." (Translation.)
A quotation such as the foregoing would seem so commonplace as
to be unworthy of note but for the fact that it is the statement of a
conclusion reached by Dr. Emile Gaillard towards the end of his work on
LaSoci6t6 Anonyme de Demain, in which he reviews various abuses, discusses the contractual theory, and leads up to the development of the institutional theory as a protection against such abuses. For instance, as a typical
abuse from which only the institutional theory may effectively guard the
investor, Dr. Gaillard cites:
"The owner of the majority, having an incontestable individual interest in appropriating to himself the entire assets of the corporation, may
do it for instance by means of the following example: He decides in
the general meeting that the corporation transfer to him all' of its personal property for the sole consideration of his paying its debts; if
the excess of the assets over liabilities is considerable, the despoiled
minority will not fail to complain. Will their complaints be admitted?
"It would not be possible to annul the contract because of damage,
for our law based on volition admits contracts concerning personal
property, no matter how damaging. Furthermore, in accordance with
the logic of the contractual theory, it would be necessary to hold the
decision valid, since the majority does not have the intention of harming
the minority but only of enriching itself." (Translation.)
Dr. Gaillard then shows with evident satisfaction how the court, in order
to prevent this obvious spoliation, invoked Article 1134 of the French Civil
Code, imposing the general obligation of good faith in all contracts. This
he refers to as the basis for the development of the so-called institutional
theory, under which a limitation is placed upon the individual right of the
stockholder in order that such right may not be invoked to sacrifice the
interest of the corporation.
Other abuses which our courts of equity would not for a moment hesitate
to restrain, but which he commends the court for having set aside, are
illustrated in the following situations. A stockholders' meeting was called
to act upon a proposal to transfer the entire assets to a third party in consideration of his assuming the liabilities. At the meeting, a shareholder proposed to take over the assets under the same conditions and to pay 25 francs
per share to the stockholders. The meeting, although there was no danger
from delay, decided not to act upon the last-minute offer but to accept immediately the first offer, in spite of its unfavorable nature. In another case,
the majority stockholders of the corporation, holding founders' shares, decided that the reserves required under the by-laws should thereafter be made
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up from the amounts taken, not from the entire net profits, but exclusively
from the portion thereof attributable to the shareholders after setting aside
the portion for the founders' shares without deducting reserves therefrom.
The shareholders lost thereby but the founders gained; and since a majority
of the shareholders held a large amount of founder ' shares, the operation
was beneficial to them.5 2 Surely a court of equity would not for a moment
have hesitated to grant relief from such gross and evident abuse of power
by the majority in either of the foregoing situations.
While not overlooking any advantages which might be derived from the
seemingly protective provisions existing and proposed in the corporation
laws in civil law countries, we must recognize that most of the protective
provisions are restrictive in effect and we must consider the causes which
have motivated them. We must consider also whether such restrictive provisions really are effective there and, if so, whether similar provisions would
add protection to that which already exists here. If these questions be answered affirmatively, we have still to consider whether any such additional
protection is worth its cost, i.e., is sufficient to compensate for the resultant
restrictions upon corporate financing. In this country, we have a highly
developed equity .jurisprudence w'hich offers a degree of protection to
minority stockholders not found, in the writer's opinion, in any civil law
country. We see examples of more flagrant abuses in civil law countries
despite the restrictive measures. It is significant that civil law countries
and courts, after experimenting with measures of a paternalistic, restrictive
nature, are now developing a so-called "institutional" theory of the corporation which, though not so labeled, has been firmly embedded in our equity
jurisprudence for many decades.
We see that corporations have reached a stage of development in this
country, in number and in the size and importance of the enterprises conducted, far exceeding that of civil law countries. We see that the provisions of the corporation laws of the Latin .American nations referred to in
this article are much more restrictive than the laws of the various states in
this country. While it can hardly be stated with positiveness, it is but a
natural assumption that the liberality of our corporation laws has at least
contributed to the growth and development of the corporation as an institution, and that to circumscribe the corporation within the restricted limits
prescribed in the corporation laws of many Latin American nations would
necessarily hamper their growth and development. In recent years, congressional investigations have exposed corporate activities which may be
characterized as pateit abuses. Of course, not all the revelations were
"GAIn LARD,
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abuses, but the abuses which were so revealed may by and large be- characterized as breaches of trust and failure to disclose material facts. Consistently with fundamental traditions in this country, corrective legislation
has aimed at full disclosure and at avoidance of conflicting duties on the part
of directors, rather than attempting paternalistic control of the nature and
kind of securities to be issued.
The corporation serves a highly useful purpose. In this country it fills
many needs for which limited share partnerships (private companies in
effect) are utilized in Latin American countries. The very flexibility of its
capital structure has permitted the corporation to serve as a mechanism for
carrying out complicated contracts dependent upon numerous conditions. The
public interest in such institution arises when it is utilized for obtaining
funds by public subscription or sale of securities. For this further reason
it would seem that corrective and restrictive measures should be directed,
as at present, not at the mechanism of corporations but rather at improper
uses made thereof and should apply particularly to the regulation of the
sale of securities.
IV.

POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OF ANGLO-SAXON CORPORATION LAWS UPON
LATIN AMERICAN LEGISLATION

Latin American and Anglo-Saxon corporation laws are the products of
different systems. The corporation laws under each system fit into the remaining body of laws. Even if the corporation laws or particular provisions
under one system could be considered preferable to those under' another,
such law or provisions, if transplanted from one system to the other,
might be so ill-adapted to the new legal system as to give entirely unsatisfactory results. It would be presumptious, therefore, even to suggest the
consideration of particular laws or provisions in this country for possible
adoption in Latin American countries. The most which might be ventured
would be to mention the effect of provisions here which have contributed
to the growth and financing of corporations. If any of these are deemed
helpful or desirable in Latin American countries where their equivalent does
not exist, a change or amendment in their laws should be such as to accomplish the desired result in the manner and form best adapted to their system
of laws.
Comparis6n of experience in corporate financing in Latin American countries and in this country suggests. the following respects in which our laws
and practice might influence those of Latin America:
(1) Only benefit could result in the long run, both to majority and minority
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interests, from measures restricting the degree of control now exercised by
the majority stockholders in most, if not all, Latin American countries.
Whether that be by formal adoption of the "institutional" theory, by the
development of an equity jurisprudence in matters of corporation law, or by
resort to general provisions requiring good faith in the interpretation of contracts is merely a choice of method.
(2) Greater latitude in the type of securities, stocks, debentures, and bonds
issuable, would undoubtedly facilitate financing for both local and foreign
capital. Objections to the greater latitude are founded upon the duty or
right of the state to prescribe the patterns of and impose limitations upon
securities of corporations for the protection of individual investors. The
focal point in the discussion is the extent of state intervention. Of course,
all restrictions which tend to assure the payment of real value for stock and
to avoid the imposition of false values upon investors (such as is sometimes
the case where par value stock is issued for overvalued property or after
the corporation has suffered losses) should be retained and strengthened
where possible, as should also provisions imposing and enforcing the liability of directors and requiring them to act in the corporate interest rather
than their individual interest. It is submitted, however, that provisions of
this nature may be retained and strengthened while greater latitude is permitted as to the nature, type, and amounts of securities issuable.
If, for instance, we take a cross-section of American industry, we find it
is financed by a wide variety of securities. In any one industry the needs and
particular situation of one corporation may- differ greatly from that of another. Changing market conditions also dictate changes in the type of securities which may be offered to the best advantage of the corporation. Obviously,
it is helpful to bona fide financing to have all reasonable latitude in determining the type and conditions of securities best suited to the particular
financing requirements of the corporation and to market conditions at the
time. Where preferred stock is not yet admitted, or its admissability doubtful, provision expressly authorizing it ought beyond question to be helpful.
Reference has been made above to the right to have authorized capital
beyond that actually subscribed and also to the helpfulness of shares without
par value. 53 Any unusual restrictions as to the terms upon which debentures
'It is interesting to note the forthright statement by Dr. Octavio Monteiro da Silva,
Deputy in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, in his report on Bill No. 424 of 1936,
a proposed revision of the present Brazilian corporation law which, with minor amendments, dates from 1882:
"Shares without par value permit an immediate impression of the true status of the
assets of the company, of the confidence which its administration deserves and of the
possibilities of the business conducted by the company. I should adopt the innovation set forth in the bill, as a salutary and moral provision. However, I was outvoted
at the outset of the work of the legislative committee, when it was still engaged on
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may be issued naturally restrict senior financing. Particularly in such case
as the debenture law of Brazil, modeled upon a Belgian law of 1873, it would
be helpful to review and determine whether existing restrictions still serve a
useful purpose.
(3) Authority for consolidations and mergers on less than unanimous
vote, where not now permitted, would be helpful. The effectiveness of such
provisions would still depend upon the income tax laws, where they exist,
and real property transfer taxes. On the assumption that consolidations are
usually beneficial in building up industrial and other enterprises where
agreed to by a substantial majority of stockholders, avoidance of excessive
or prohibitive transfer taxes would seem a laudable encouragement from
the governments. If, for instance, the law should permit the merger of one
or more corporations into an existing corporation and the continued corporate existence of the latter rather than the creation of a new corporation,
at least a portion of the high transfer taxes might be saved.
(4) Revision of procedural requirements is a matter which touches intimately the existing body of laws and customary practice and procedure. Any
radical change for the particular benefit of corporations might be more confusing than helpful. However, any simplification of procedure and shortening of time element involved would be quite helpful. In countries which
require the publication of all stockholders' proceedings, any great growth in
corporate activity would make corporate publications exceedingly voluminous
and burdensome. Perhaps a system of filing for public inspection by interested parties or the mere requirement, as here, that the records be open to
inspection by any stockholder, would simplify proceedings immensely.
(5) Revision of tax laws to Encourage corporate activities and financing
not only would be helpful to economic growth, but also might be fairly
expected, as a result of such growth, to maintain or even increase tax revenues. For instance, in many countries the tax on capital stock, which corresponds to our organization taxes in different states, is relatively high. As
noted above, consolidations and mergers are often prohibited by heavy
property transfer taxes. Also, where income tax laws exist, express provisions recognizing tax-free reorganizations are calculated to increase and
encourage corporate activities. Generally speaking, mortgage recording
taxes are high to a point which discourages financing by secured bonds.
(6) Revision of mortgage recording laws likewise touches closely upon
the commercial code. My associates on the committee feared that this innovation
would be wrongly interpreted and applied among us." (Translation.)
This quotation brings to mind the story of the legislator in a Western State who introduced at numerous sessions a bill to permit corporations to issue stock without par value,
the bill making no progress until he changed its title to "A Bill to Prevent Stock Frauds."
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the general body of law in the particular country. The length of time for
which registration is valid is important, as is also express provision that
upon re-registration within the period the pre-existing priority is maintained.
Presumably the limitation upon the period for which registration is valid is
designed to facilitate searches for liens. Where compelling reasons exist for
restricting a general limitation to a period of thirty years or less, provision
might be made for a special register for corporate bond issues.
Assuming, as seems generally admitted, that corporate financing has attained greater growth in this country than in Latin American countries, it
would be difficult to attribute that growth to any particular cause. Certainly,
reasonable flexibility of the corporation laws of our various states has contributed towards it. Indeed, it is sometimes suggested that the fact that
incorporation is governed by the laws of the respective states, rather than
by federal law, is responsible for the flexibility permitted and, according to
some, the degeneration of liberty into license. The states have vied with one
another in enacting attractive corporation laws. We have seen the time when
New Jersey was a favorite state for incorporation, then Maine, and later
Delaware, Florida, and Maryland, so that now the laws of many states are
considered flexible and favorable.
In the Latin American nations, incorporation is by federal or national law,
so that in none of those nations is the same internal situation present as in
this country. However, considering the Americas as a whole, the relative
advantages and defects encountered in the laws of the respective countries
constitute definite factors favoring or discouraging both the mobilization of
local capital in productive enterprise and the attraction of foreign capital for
a like purpose. In that sense, the Latin American nations may also be considered to vie with one another, not merely to attract prospective incorporators to establish a technical domicile and pay taxes in the country, which is
the motivating factor as between our states, but rather to mobilize or attract
capital for permanent investment within the country.

